Destabilized countries with significant inter-ethnic tension, political corruption and fragile security strategies are acutely vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist organizations, as seen recently with the emergence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.  The Central Asian Republics may fit the criteria for such a terrorist petri dish, and in particular, the Kyrgyz Republic.  Though one of the only democracies in the region, the Kyrgyz Republic is particularly vulnerable to the penetration of extremist networks due to its deep political and ethnic divisions, weak rule of law, and relatively undeveloped anti-terrorism programs.

Recruitment of Kyrgyz citizens by extremists is already a strong concern of the Kyrgyz government.  In February 2014, online Eurasian publication Kabar reported Rahat Sulaimanov, an official representative of the State National Security Committee of Kyrgyzstan (GKNB), as saying the GKNB has “evidence that some Kyrgyz recruits who took part in Syrian war have already returned home.  They returned with the intention to carry out various types of terrorist attacks and robberies. To date, 20 of them are detained.”  The GKNB claims to have some inside information on these recruitment activities, including “that recruiters urging Kyrgyz citizens to go to war in Syria receive $500 for each recruited.”  A report from September 2014 states the government has evidence of about 150 Kyrgyz citizens taking part in military actions in Syria, 8 of whom were recently confirmed killed.  An additional report from the US Embassy in Bishkek states that in 2013, the GKNB “arrested two citizens of Kyrgyzstan and one from Kazakhstan who were suspected members of a terrorist cell in Southern Kyrgyzstan”.  These individuals, according to the GKNB, had “purchased weapons, explosive materials, and communication equipment.”

In addition to recruitment of Kyrgyz citizens to extremist causes in Syria, the Kyrgyz Republic is concerned “about the potential for an influx of terrorist element into its territory following the withdrawal of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops [from Afghanistan] in 2014,” due to its proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Although the Kyrgyz Republic does not share a direct border with these two countries, it is separated only by a small and penetrable Tajikistan to its south.  In addition to having a mountainous and porous border, the Kyrgyz Republic is vulnerable due to the ethnic conflict that has sparked the violence and chaos in its southern cities, most notably of late the ethnic violence and what some consider genocide in the cities of Osh and Jalalabad home to the majority of the ethnic Uzbek population.

A deep political and ethnic division within the Kyrgyz Republic has left their citizens particularly vulnerable to the infiltration of terrorist organizations due to the violence, displacement and fractured government control it has caused.  Ethnic tensions are not new in this area.  The indigenous populations of the Asian Steppes are comprised of traditionally nomadic peoples, making it difficult to draw state boundaries based on ethnic demographics.  It is also unlikely that Tsarist Russia was concerned with respecting ethnic communities when it annexed the territory now known as the Kyrgyz Republic in 1876.  As a result, about 72% of the people in the Kyrgyz Republic are ethnic Kyrgyz, while about 14.5% are Uzbeks, 9% are Russian and the remaining 4-5% are made up of Dungans, Uyghurs, Tajiks, Kazakhs and Ukrainians.  Since its independence from Soviet Russia in 1991, national politics in the Kyrgyz Republic have been marked by corruption, dissatisfaction in government representation, mistreatment of minorities, massive protests and only one stable transition of power between its five presidents.

In April 2010, violent protests in Bishkek resulted in the ousting of then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who since his first elected win in 2005 had “manipulated the parliament to accrue new powers to the presidency” and had won his second election, as many saw it, through corrupt means.  After the departure of President Bakiyev, fighting broke out between groups of ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the southern cities of Osh and Jalalabad.  Statistics vary depending on the source, but official deaths during that time were reported by Human Rights Watch as between 356-900, and reported by BBC as more than 400.  Local news source NewEurasia.net cites that “hundreds of people were killed, [and] ten thousands became refugees and internally displaced.”  The Guardian cites “400,000 [were] forced to flee.”

There are different theories as to what caused the uprisings.  Popular belief was that the former President and his supporters “attempted to take a political revenge by destabilizing (the) situation in Kyrgyzstan in order to obtain power back through inter-ethnic conflicts of civil war.”  Others feel that outside actors were involved for some sort of political gain. Mars Sariev, a Kyrgyz “political expert,” said that “autonomous groups of provocateurs of other nationalities shot both the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in order to push them into conflict.”  The UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, “asserted that the UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights collected persuasive evidence from witnesses, including UN officers in Osh and Jalalabad, [confirming] the fact that these events were not spontaneous,” and were “purposeful and well organized.”  To this day there are no further leads on who carried out these operations.

Regardless of the provocateurs identities, the atmosphere in the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in the south of where ethnic tensions are strongest, is primed for chaos and insecurity, making it an ideal location for extremist groups to permeate. A community without certain law and order is an ideal home-base for extremists to initiate recruiting and operations.

One thing is clear amidst the violence and confusion of 2010:  there is an unquestionable ethnic bias amongst law enforcement in the Kyrgyz Republic, a reflection of the disenfranchisement of its Uzbek population.  The Uzbeks are virtually unrepresented in government, the police force and the courts, leaving them vulnerable to abuse and without protection in many circumstances.  In government, only 3 members of the 120 member parliament are ethnic Uzbeks, 2.5%, despite that they make up almost 15% of the population, and Uzbeks are said to be “underrepresented in the judiciary… intelligence service and police” as well.  During and after the violence in 2010, a disproportionate amount of Uzbeks were attacked, arrested, tortured and put on trial, and more events of violence against Kyrgyz were answered by police than against Uzbeks.  Human Rights Watch documented on-the ground reports since the start of the violence, and noted these patterns in the response of police:

“The security forces seemed to focus resources on addressing the danger presented by Uzbeks, but not by Kyrgyz, even after it became clear that Kyrgyz mobs posed an imminent threat; and the forces took very limited, if any, operational measures to protect the Uzbek population.”  Destruction of Uzbeks’ property during that time was also disproportionate, including “more than 2,000 homes [that] were destroyed, most of them belong[ing] to ethnic Uzbeks.”

The abuses of power by police against Uzbeks went beyond negligence.  Many reports of torture and extortion surfaced, which Human Rights Watch followed closely.  One particularly horrifying event was the detention of an ethnic Uzbek named Usmonzhon Kholmirzaev, who was “allegedly tortured by police in southern Kyrgyzstan,” then “died on August 9, 2011, two days after he was released from police custody.”  According to his autopsy, Kholmirzaev died of internal bleeding caused by a fractured sternum, which matched his story of police jumping on his chest during his beatings in custody.  The man’s wife said the “police tried to extort $6,000 from him in exchange for releasing him,” and “threatened to press charges against him in connection with the June 2010 interethnic violence.”  To add to the already long list of human rights violations, including death by torture, the police who detained him came in to his house without an arrest warrant, in unidentified, civilian clothes, and did not say where they were taking him, according to Human Rights Watch.  Human Rights Watch “documented four such cases in one week in July [2010] on just one street in Osh.”

Equally disturbing are the accounts of witnesses that describe men in military fatigues and with military vehicles pushing back neighborhood barricades made by ethnic Uzbeks in their neighborhoods and shooting to clear a way for mobs of looters to enter.  The authorities, however, “claim that Kyrgyz mobs stole the military uniforms, weapons and vehicles in the attacks.”  Either scenario is appalling in its own special way.

A huge target for terrorist organizations is a country with a weak rule of law.  This includes an environment in which due process is unassured or impossible, and in which legal authorities can be easily bribed to look the other way, or even cooperate.  Rule of law in the Kyrgyz Republic is weak, exemplified not only by the corruption and abuse cited earlier, but also through the country’s legal system. Obtaining a fair trial can be difficult in the Kyrgyz Republic, especially if you are an ethnic Uzbek.  Harassment, violence and intimidation are unchecked surrounding court proceedings.  During the trials in the aftermath of the 2010 violence, in which all but one case had an Uzbek defendant, “witnesses, lawyers and even judges have faced verbal abuse and threats,” while “police and court guards… did little to intervene.”  In the case against notable human rights advocate, ethnic Uzbek Azimjon Askarov, his lawyer said he “could not bring any witnesses to the trial, because [he] could not guarantee their safety.”  He said when witnesses showed up previously, they were pushed away and harassed by relatives of the ethnic Kyrgyz victim in the case.

Even if lawyers could get their witnesses to court, it is not assured that the trial would be fair.  Freedom House gives the Kyrgyz Republic a score of 4/16 under the “Rule of Law” category.  According to Freedom House, “The judiciary is not independent and remains dominated by the executive branch,” adding that “corruption among judges, who are underpaid, is widespread.”  Uzbeks were even afraid to vote in the 2010 elections, for obvious reasons.  The Guardian quoted an Uzbek man in Osh, who said, “I’m not going to vote… They burned down my house.  They killed my neighbour.  They wanted to kill my family.  They are all involved.”

The corruption of the Kyrgyz Republic’s legal system goes beyond the courtroom to the prison system.  One of the most high profile examples is release of Chechen crime boss Aziz Batukaev from jail, where he was supposed to be serving a 16 year sentence.  Batukaev is known for his involvement in drug “trafficking, violent crime, and the murder of a parliamentary deputy and a state prison official,” yet was escorted out of prison by a convoy of Audis and SUVs to a chartered plane, which flew him to Chechnya.  According to court officials in Naryn, the city in which Batukaev was serving his sentence, they had “medical documents asserting the crime boss was suffering from leukemia, and … needed to be released immediately … to seek medical care.”  This is difficult to believe under the circumstances, especially since bribery is prevalent among the Kyrgyz legal system and organized crime has a history of ties with government.  Former President Bakiyev, ousted in 2010 due to abuse of power, was frequently accused by his political opponents of harboring close relationships with Batukaev and another crime boss, Kamchybek Kolbaev.

In a country with such a shaky justice systems, it is easy for terrorist organizations to hide their operations.  It is also unlikely such operations would be exposed, investigated or prosecuted properly as a result of corruption, bribery or opportunism.  In the Kyrgyz Republic, it is not hard to imagine what extremist groups could accomplish if they wished to set up regular operations within its borders.

In addition to strong ethnic tensions and a weak rule of law, Kyrgyz intelligence and anti-terrorist programs are underdeveloped and underprepared.  They have taken measures to improve their response and capabilities, but at this time are largely untested in carrying out proactive counter-terrorism missions.  A report from the US Embassy in Bishkek on the state off anti-terrorist operations outlines some of the roadblocks the Kyrgyz Republic faces, and the assistance they are being given by the United States.

The US Department of State has what they call an Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which has helped the law enforcement of the Kyrgyz Republic develop greater capacity to address and prevent terrorist threats.  This is done through training focused on airport security and how to conduct terrorism-related investigations.  In addition to training, the embassy has also funded the “construction of additional border towers” and “renovations and enhancements to existing border towers” throughout the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan through their Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance office.

The US Embassy’s report, written to reflect the year 2013, gives us an idea of the lack of sophistication the Kyrgyz Republic’s anti-terrorism programs have.  It cites that while “GKNB’s antiterrorism unit has demonstrated the capacity to quickly react to bomb scares or other potential terrorist threats, it has limited capacity to act to counter the threat in practice.  It lacks both specialized training and equipment.”  It also states that the GKNB does not keep a “terrorist screening watchlist,” or have any resources dedicated to tracking and recognizing high profile terrorists who may come in or out of the country.  The report concludes that while steps are taken in the right direction, the Kyrgyz government still has major roadblocks to achieving a strong anti-terrorist task-force.  These interferences include “interagency rivalries, a lack of coordination between the GKNB and the MOI (Ministry of Interior Affairs), and budgetary constraints.”  The report says that their current system, with “inefficient Soviet-era bureaucratic structures, low salaries, and frequent personnel turnover hampered law enforcement efforts” in these areas.

Stopping a terrorist organization is more than just preventing imminent attacks and securing borders.  Money laundering is a large part of a terrorist organization’s operations, which they will carry out wherever it is easiest, even if they are not planning attacks in the area.  To address this, Kyrgyzstan has joined international organizations that collectively fight money laundering, including the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Finance of Terrorism and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF).  In October 2011, Kyrgyzstan publicly committed themselves to work with these agencies to address their deficiencies in “anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist finance.”  However, FATF identified other issues areas the Kyrgyz government needs to improve upon, such as “the criminalization of money laundering in accordance with international standards; improving the framework for freezing terrorist assets; and improving the AML/CFT supervisory program,” part of the World Bank’s assessment on anti-money laundering efforts.  In 2012 the government of Kyrgyzstan did set up a “Commission on Combating the Financing of Terrorism but it was largely inactive in 2013.”

In conclusion, the Kyrgyz Republic has some distinct weaknesses that make it attractive to terrorist organizations as a base of operation, if they ever desired. With the ability to bribe public officials and a lack of sophisticated anti-terrorism operations, it would be relatively easy to convince the right people to turn a blind-eye to illicit activity. Disadvantaged minorities may also pose as easy targets for recruitment; high ethnic tensions can lead to a lack of economic opportunity in mainstream society, making it attractive to work with a well-funded organization. If the number of fighters returning from the war in Syria continue to grow, ISIS and other terrorist organizations could potentially have a built-in base of support for further activity.  A comprehensive strategy would be needed to combat such a possibility: a stronger state-sponsored anti-terrorism program is needed, including highly paid officials who are less susceptible to bribery; a commitment to human rights reforms, one which includes community re-education and conflict resolution; and a stronger guarantee of due process for all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, including a police force willing to protect ethnic minorities.